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It is generally believed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible, due to
widespread acceptance of an impossibility proof that utilizes quantum entaglement cheating. In
this paper, we delineate how the impossibiliy proof formulation misses various types of quantum bit
commitment protocols based on two-way quantum communications. We point out some of the gaps
in the impossibility proof reasoning, and present corresponding counterexamples. Three different
types of bit commitment protocols are constructed with several new protocol techniques. A specific
Type 1 protocol is described and proved unconditionally secure. The security proof of a specific
Type 2 protocol is also sketched. The security of Type 3 protocols is as yet open.
∗E-mail: yuen@ece.northwestern.edu
†Note: this paper analyzes in detail, for the first time, the various gaps in the QBC impossibility
proof, some of which I indicated before but only one of which seems to be understood. There is clearly a
need to focus on these gaps, which is an issue logically distinct from whether any protocol can be proved
unconditionally secure. One of the original three protocols I described in the QCM at Capri, July 2000,
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There is a nearly universal acceptance of the general impossibility of secure quantum bit
commitment (QBC), taken to be a consequence of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type
entanglement cheating which supposedly rules out QBC and other quantum protocols that
have been proposed for various cryptographic objectives [1]. In a bit commitment scheme,
one party, Adam, provides another party, Babe, with a piece of evidence that he has chosen
a bit b (0 or 1) which is committed to her. Later, Adam would open the commitment by
revealing the bit b to Babe and convincing her that it is indeed the committed bit with the
evidence in her possession, which she can verify. The usual concrete example is for Adam to
write down the bit on a piece of paper, which is then locked in a safe to be given to Babe,
while keeping for himself the safe key that can be presented later to open the commitment.
The evidence should be binding, i.e., Adam should not be able to change it, and hence the
bit, after it is given to Babe. It should also be concealing, i.e., Babe should not be able
to tell from it what the bit b is. Otherwise, either Adam or Babe would be able to cheat
successfully.
In standard cryptography, secure bit commitment is to be achieved either through a
trusted third party, or by invoking an unproved assumption concerning the complexity of
certain computational problems. By utilizing quantum eects, specically the intrinsic un-
certainty of a quantum state, various QBC schemes not involving a third party have been
proposed to be unconditionally secure, in the sense that neither Adam nor Babe could cheat
with any signicant probability of success as a matter of physical laws. In 1995-1996, a sup-
posedly general proof of the impossibility of unconditionally secure QBC, and the insecurity
of previously proposed protocols, was presented [2]-[6]. Henceforth it has been generally
accepted that secure QBC and related objectives are impossible as a matter of principle
[7]-[11].
There is basically just one impossibility proof, which gives the EPR attacks for the cases
of equal and unequal density operators that Babe has for the two dierent bit values. The
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proof purports to show that if Babe’s cussessful cheating probability PBc is close to the
value 1/2, which is obtainable from pure guessing of the bit value, then Adam’s successful
cheating probability PAc is close to the perfect value 1. This result is stronger than the mere
impossibility of unconditional security, namely that it is impossible to have both PBc  1/2
and PAc  0. The impossibility proof describes the EPR attack on a specic type of protocols,
and then argues that all possible QBC protocols are of this type.
Typically, one would expect that a proof of impossibility of carrying out some thing
X would show that any possible way of doing X would entail a feature that is logically
contradictory to given principles, as, for example, in the cases of quantum no-cloning [12, 13]
and von Neumann’s no-hidden-variable theorem [14]. In the present case, one may expect a
proof which shows, e.g., that any QBC protocol that is concealing is necessarily not binding.
It is important for this purpose that the framework of QBC protocol formulation is all-
inclusive. In the absence of a proof that all possible QBC protocols have been included in its
formulation, any impossibility proof is at best incomplete. Indeed, in the QBC impossibility
proof, only certain techniques of protocol design, such as the use of classical random numbers
in a quantum protocol, are included in its formulation without showing that all possible
techniques have been included. In this paper, we will describe several new techniques that
are not accounted for in the impossibility proof formulation.
There are two related assertions in the impossibility proof that are crucial to both its
claim of universality in general, and its specic claim of covering the use of random numbers
in particular. These are the assertions that all measurements in the commitment phase of
a quantum protocol can be postponed until the opening and the verication phases, and
that classical random numbers can be equivalently described by pure quantum states, via
quantum purication or the doctrine of \Church of the Larger Hilbert Space." As we will
show in this paper, both assertions are fallacious in various ways. Furthermore, in the case of
classical random numbers, the impossibility proof does not even give a correct quantitative
formulation of the concealing condition, and thus proves nothing to begin with.
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The essential argument of the general impossiblity proof is described in Section 2, and
a proper framework for QBC protocols is discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe
several new protocol techniques that lead to the development of three new types of protocols
not covered by the impossibility proof. In Section 5 we describe Type 1 protocols, for which
measurements during commitment cannot be postponed until opening and verication. A
specic protocol QBC1 is presented, with unconditional security proved in the Appendix. In
Section 6, the logic underlying Type 2 protocols is delineated. A specic protocol, QBC4, is
presented with an outline of the security proof. In Section 7, the widely accepted equivalence
between classical randomness and quantum purication is analyzed. We will show that they
are not equivalent in bit commitment. We also introduce Type 3 protocols, the security
status of which is yet undecided. The last Section (8) contains a brief summary of the main
points.
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2 The impossibility proof: Type 0 protocols
The impossibility proof, in its claimed generality, has never been systematically spelled out
in one place, but the essential ideas that constitute this proof are generally agreed upon [3]-
[11]. The formulation and the proof can be cast as follows. Adam and Babe have available
to them two-way quantum communications that terminate in a nite number of exchanges,
during which either party can perform any operation allowed by the laws of quantum physics,
all processes ideally accomplished with no imperfection of any kind. During these exchanges,
Adam would have committed a bit with associated evidence to Babe. It is argued that, at
the end of the commitment phase, there is an entangled pure state jbi, b 2 f0, 1g, shared
between Adam who possesses state space HA, and Babe who possesses HB. For example, if





with orthonormal jeii 2 HA and given jφbii 2 HB. Adam would open by making a measure-
ment on HA, say fjeiig, communicating to Babe his result i0 and b; then Babe would verify
by measuring the corresponding projector jφbi0ihφbi0j on HB, accepting as correct only the
result 1.
More generally, when classical random numbers known only to one party are used in the
commitment, they are to be replaced by corresponding quantum entanglement purication.
The commitment of jφbii with probability pbi in (1) is, in fact, an example of such purication.
An example involving Babe is an anonymous state protocol [15]-[17] where jφbii in (1) is to
be obtained by Adam applying unitary operations Ubi on state jψki 2 HB sent to him by
Babe with probability λk, k 2 f1, . . . , Kg. Generally, for any random k used by Babe, it is
argued that from the doctrine of the \Church of the Larger Hilbert Space" [10], it is to be







where jψki 2 HB1 and the jfki0s are complete orthonormal in HB2 kept by Babe while HB1
would be sent to Adam. With such purication, it is claimed that any protocol involving
classical secret parameters would become quantum-mechanically determinate, i.e., the shared
state jbi at the end of commitment is completely known to both parties. Note that, from
(2), this means that both fλkg and fjfkig are taken to be known exactly to both Babe and
Adam.
Why should Adam and Babe share a pure state at the end of commitment? Any mea-
surement followed by a unitary operation Ul depending on the measurement result l can be
equivalently described by an overall unitary operator. Thus, if the orthonormal fjglig on





jglihglj ⊗ Ul (3)
on HC1 ⊗ HC2 . It is claimed that any actual measurement during commitment can be
postponed until the opening and the verication phases of the protocol without aecting
the protocol in any essential way. In order to maintain quantum determinacy, the exact
fjglig in (3) are taken to be known to both parties. Let us use k to denote Babe’s secret
parameter, and i to denote Adam’s secret parameter, such as the i with probabilities fpig
in (1). These crucial assumptions of openly known fpig, fλkg, fjfkig, and fjglig are made
in the impossibility proof through the use of known xed quantum computers or quantum
machines for data storage and processing by either party [3], [6], [9, Appendix], even though
the control of such machines belongs only to one of the parties.
Generally, Babe can try to identify the bit from ρBb , the marginal state of jbi on HB, by
performing an optimal quantum measurement that yields the optimal cheating probability
PBc for her. Adam cheats by committing j0i and making a measurement on HA to open i0
and b = 1. His probability of successful cheating is computed through jbi, his particular
measurement, and Babe’s verifying measurement; the one optimized over all of his possible
actions will be denoted PAc . For a xed measurement basis, Adam’s cheating can be described
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by a unitary operator UA on HA. Thus, his general EPR attack goes as follows. For a general
protocol, the shared state jbi at the end of commitment is not necessarily of the form (1),
but is nevertheless an openly known pure state on HA ⊗ HB. If the protocol is perfectly











where j~φji are the eigenvectors of ρBb and fj~ebjig for each b are complete orthonormal in
HA, it follows that Adam can obtain j1i from j0i by a local cheating transformation UA
that brings fje0jig to fje1jig. Whatever operations he needs to perform to open, which
may involve identifying his previous operation rather than a state on HB, can be carried
out accordingly after the cheating transformation. Thus his optimum cheating probability
is PAc = 1 in this case.
For unconditional, rather than perfect, security, one demands that both cheating prob-
abilities PBc − 1/2 and PAc can be made arbitarily small when a security parameter n is








PAc = 0. (5)
The condition (5) says that, for any  > 0, there exists an n0 such that for all n > n0,
PBc − 1/2 <  and PAc < , to which we may refer as -concealing and -binding. These
cheating probabilities are to be computed purely on the basis of logical and physical laws,
and thus would survive any change in technology, including an increase in computational





2 + kρB0 − ρB1 k1

, (6)
where k  k1 is the trace norm, kτk1  tr(τ yτ)1/2 for a trace-class operator τ , but the
corresponding PAc is more involved. Nevertheless, the impossibility proof shows that Adam








PAc = 1 (7)
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within its formulation [2, 15]. Note that the impossibility proof makes a stronger statement
(IP) than the mere impossibility of (US), i.e., (7) is stronger than (5) not being possible.
There are various gaps and implicit assumptions hidden in the impossibility proof, the
presence of which renders the proof incomplete in several ways. As to be discussed in the
following, some of these can be partially justied or closed, but many still remain. We will
refer to protocols that t this impossibility proof formulation as Type 0 protocols, and will
describe three additional types, 1, 2, and 3, that are clearly not covered by this proof. Before
proceeding, we rst describe what may constitute a QBC protocol.
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3 Proper framework for protocol formulation
The following two principles, the Intent Principle and the Libertarian Principle, govern the
viability and meaningfulness of any bit commitment protocol in a descriptive, not normative,
sense. That is, they would be satised in what we would take intuitively to be a proper
protocol, and are not imposed in a legislative fashion, as discussed in the following.
INTENT PRINCIPLE | Each party would act to achieve the intent of the pro-
tocol if no cheating by the other party is (probabilistically) possible.
Thus, each party would cooperate so that the protocol would not be aborted, which
happens when one party is found cheating by the other through a possible cheat-detection
mechanism during the commitment phase. Since each party can always just abort by nonco-
operation during any stage of any two-party protocol, the Intent Principle does not exclude
any action not otherwise possible. Thus, if the cheating detection probability leads to an
overall cheating success probability within the given , the protocol is a proper one and
cannot be declared illegitimate because one party may keep cheating, though keep being
detected.
We also have the
LIBERTARIAN PRINCIPLE | Each party can freely perform any possible local
operation at any stage of the protocol, constrained only by the Intent Principle
for cooperation.
Thus, no party can be assumed to be honest in anything if the action leads to his/her own
advantage and would not get caught. That is, each party can cheat whenever possible, unless
it violates the Intent Principle for cooperation. There would be no need for any protocol if
the parties can be assumed honest.
Any sequence of two-way quantum communication exchanges that resuls in bit com-
mitment under the Intent Principle is evidently a QBC protocol, whose security is to be
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analyzed under the Libertarian Principle. More importantly, any QBC formulation that
fails to include all such sequences does not capture all possible QBC protocols. The present
framework is more general than the \Yao method" [19, 6] in that cheating detection is al-
lowed during commitment, and is more specic in the explicit formulation of the above two
principles. It can be seen that the impossibility proof formulation is not complete in that it
misses protocols with cheating detection during commitment because such detection would
involve actual measurements that cannot be postponed until after commitment if jbi is
assumed openly known. Otherwise, Adam may cheat successfully by utilizing detailed knol-
wedge of Babe’s instrument, which makes it reversible, but which are actually irrelevant for
the protocol. Such a known jbi assumption is both unreasonable and unrealistic, in addi-
tion to violating the Libertarian Principle which allows Babe to use a dierent instrument
for storage and processing. Even when the cheating detection can be deferred until after
commitment without Adam being able to cheat successfully because of that, the protocol
may be fundamentally changed to only a cheat-sensitive one [19]. Further discussion will be
found in Section 5.
As in all QBC formulations so far, it is assumed in this paper that Adam opens perfectly
on one bit value, say b = 0. More generally, one may allow QBC protocols that open on one
bit with a success probability P0 = 1− 0 for a small 0. It appears that protocols for which
neither bit can be opened with near-unity probability are of little interest. In conjunction
with -concealing and -binding, one may then consider the possibility of (, 0)-protocols,
the detailed treatment of which will be given elsewhere.
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4 New protocol techniques, or gaps in the impossiblity
proof
In this section we describe three new techniques for constructing QBC protocols, which are
not covered by the impossibility formulation. Our Type 1 protocol is based on the rst
technique, Type 2 on the next two and on random numbers, and Type 3 on the second one
and on random numbers. Each of these protocol types will be discussed separately in the
following sections.
In the first technique, Babe asks Adam to reveal a random part of his committed evidence,
after which the protocol remains -concealing. As Adam is forced to measure on HA in order
to respond, his cheating entanglement is destroyed.
The second technique introduces testing on states of an ensemble, in space or in time,
submitted by the other party, in order to check whether only admissible states of the protocol
are being used. The protocol is aborted if cheating is detected by a measurement. Such
protocols are allowed under the Intent Principle, but not included in the impossibility proof
formulation. The eect of this technique is to reduce, during quantum purication of a secret
parameter, the use of any jΨi 2 HB1 ⊗ HB2 to only those of the form (2) for a xed set
fjψkig. There is no need for this technique if one assumes, as in the impossibility proof, that
only such jΨi is to be used anyway.
Note that the argument of measurement postponement during commitment, as given by
(3), does not apply to the case where Ul acts on the space HC1 itself. This happens when
the testing is achieved through a POM measurement on HC1 , described by f, I −g, with
state on HC1 projected by  upon a zero reading from I − . Any protocol having such a
step is not covered by the impossibility proof.
For the third technique, consider a protocol in which Babe forms (2) and sends Adam
HB1 , with jψki = jψk1ijψk2i in HB1 = HB11 ⊗ HB12 . Adam randomly switches the state in
HB11 to be that of jψk1i or jψk2i by the unitary perumation Pm, m 2 f1, 2g, modulates the
resulting state in HB11 by a single Ub for each b, and sends it to Babe. He opens by revealing
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b, his random permuation Pm, and returning HB12 . Babe veries by testing the apropriate
states in HB11 for checking b, and HB12 for checking that there is no change. Thus, Adam
cannot entangle and use HB12 . The protocol can be both concealing and binding because,
for the nal commitment state jbi with Adam entangling the Pm with jeii 2 HA1 , we have
HA = HA1⊗HB12 and HB = HB11⊗HB12 . Thus, ρB0 can be close to ρB1 because HB12⊗HB13
is not available to Babe for her cheating. However, only HA1 , and not HA, is avaiable to
Adam’s cheating, so he cannot apply the required cheating UA.
Example 1 (protocol QBCp2)
As a specic example, consider the case HB1 = HB11 ⊗HB12 ⊗HB13 ⊗HB14 of four qubits,
with fjψkig = fj1ij2ij3ij4i, j4ij1ij2ij3i, j3ij4ij1ij2i, j2ij3ij4ij1ig, where fj1i, j2i, j3i, j4ig are,
e.g., a xed set S0 of four possible BB84 states on a given great circle of a qubit. Adam
permutes each jψki by one of four possible Pm, and returns the rst qubit to Babe unchanged
for b = 0, while shifted by pi/2 in the great circie for b = 1. Assume rst that Babe either did
not entangle, or cannot use her entanglement in HB2 , so that Adam receives one of the four
possible jψki. It is then easy to see that ρB110 (ψk) = ρB111 (ψk) for all k. It is also not hard to
see that no entanglement of the four possible Pm would produce a rotation on the rst qubit
while not disturbing the others. Thus, Adam cannot cheat perfectly and has a xed PAc for
this protocol which is not arbitrarily close to one, even though it is perfectly concealing. In
Section 6, we will indicate how Babe can be eectively denied her use of entanglement via
HB2 .
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5 Some measurements cannot be postponed: Type 1
protocols
The assertion that in general one can describe any protocol by a pure openly known state
jbi at the end of commitment before opening is crucial for the validity of the impossibility
proof. It implies, in particular, that the cheating performance of both parties would not
be aected by postponing all possible measurements during commitment until the opening
phase by Adam and the verication phase by Babe. That this is not generally true can be
seen from the case that Adam makes a cheating transformation and then a measurment as
he opens, compared to his rst making a measurement before opening. Why he would even
do such a thing as in this latter case is illustrated by the following type of protocols, which
constitute a new technique for secure quantum bit commitment, missed by the impossibility
proof formulation.
Consider a protocol of the form (1) in which each jφbii is a product of n qubit states.
Assume that if the states of any n0 of n qubits are unknown to Babe, the protocol remains
-concealing. Then, at the end stage of commitment, Babe can ask Adam to reveal the states
in n− n0 randomly chosen qubits in her possession, and check that they are correct. Babe
cannot improve her cheating probability through quantum purication of this random choice
of n−n0 qubits, because this is an operation on the evidence Adam already commits. On the
other hand, from (1) Adam has to make a measurement on the jeii to reply accurately, after
which a particular jφbji is pinned down, and he can only cheat by declaring a specic jφ0ji
to be another jφ1ii. The corresponding PAc may be arranged to be smaller than  or, in any
event, not having the limiting value one for large n and thus contradicting the impossibility
proof. Note that the burden is on the impossibility proof claimer to show that such protocols
are not possible, which has not been done.
Indeed, such protocols are not only possible, but can, in fact, be unconditionally secure.
A general subclass of such protocols can be described as follows. Let each qubit in jφbji be in
one of two possible states, j0i and j1i, and consider a Boolean function f : f0, 1gn ! f0, 1g.
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There may be many Boolean functions f for which the above concealing requirement is
fullled, as, for example, in the case of the parity function [15]. To prove unconditional
security for such a protocol, one has to show that PAc , obtained by any way of entangling
that particular f , not just the one in the form (1), is still -binding. The following protocol
is proved secure in the Appendix.
PROTOCOL QBC1
(i) Adam sends Babe a sequence of n qubits, each is either one of
fjφi, jφ0ig, such that an even number of jφi’s corresponds to b = 0,
and an odd number to b = 1.
(ii) Babe randomly picks n0 qubits among the n ones and asks Adam to
reveal the remaining n − n0 qubit states. She verifies that they are
correct by measuring the corresponding projectors.
(iii) Adam opens the commitment by declaring b and the remaining n0
qubit states. Babe verifies the corresponding measurements.
If this type of protocols is modied by postponing all measurements until opening and
verication via (2) and (3), with jbi taken to be known to Adam, then he can indeed cheat
successfully. Without measurement readings that pin down specic results, everything is
reversible and rather manipulable, assuming everything is known. But, as indicated already
in Section 3, the possibility of such manipulation of Babe’s instruments is not characteristic
of a real situation. Not only is it the case that Adam’s measurement and cheating operations
do not commute, but also a totally dierent cheating operation is needed, with corresponding
new information. In any case, such cheating can be thwarted by Babe’s actual measurements
during commitment, which forces Adam’s actual measurement. The latter would then de-
stroy the coherence Adam needs for cheating. There is no need to consider what Adam may
know about Babe’s instrument. It is important for this purpose that Babe performs the
actual measurement in step (ii), although she doesn’t have to \look" at the results until step
(iii).
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One denite conclusion of this section is that, depending on the protocol, measurements
may or may not be postponed to opening and verication without altering the essence of the
protocol. While measurement postponement may maintain equivalence in some situations,
there is already no argument oered in the impossibility proof as to why Babe’s measurement
during commitment would not help her defeat Adam’s cheating, even though she cannot
thereby improve her own cheating.
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6 Who has which space: Type 2 protocols
The use of the second technique in Section 4, test for cheating via measurement, has the
eect of changing and pinning down the -concealing condition of the protocol, as compared
to one without the test. Generally, the condition
ρB0 (Ψ)
 ρB1 (Ψ) for one jΨi 2 HB1 ⊗HB2 , (8)
while weaker than
ρB0 (Ψ)
 ρB1 (Ψ) for every jΨi 2 HB1 ⊗HB2 , (9)
is not equivalent to
ρB0 (ψk)
 ρB1 (ψk) 8 jψki 2 HB1 . (10)
Specically, (8) does not imply (10) because there can be a jψ1i for which ρB0 (ψ1) and ρB1 (ψ1)
are far apart under (8) with λ1 small [17]. Also, it is easy to check that, in Example 1 of
Section 4, (10) holds with equality, but there is a nite gap for kρB0 −ρB1 k1 upon entanglement
with HB2 . This renders false the claim that the use of random numbers as in (10) can be
equivalently described by their quantum purications as in (8). further discussion os this
point is given in Section 7. Here we note that (9) is, in general, a sucient but not necessary
(at least not having been proved necessary) condition for the protocol to be concealing, again
to be further discussed in Section 7. It is rather a severe restriction on the protocol that can
be relaxed to (8) with test for cheating. However, if one assumes that it is only necessary to
impose (8), as in the impossibility proof, the test-for-cheating technique is not needed.
A Type 2 protocol would work as follows. A large n-sequence (n-fold tensor product) of
qubit states, drawn independently with probability λk from a xed set S0 = fjψkig, would
be sent from Babe to Adam, each state named by its position in the sequence. Adam puts
aside randomly chosen n0 of them, and asks Babe to reveal the remaining n − n0 ones for
testing. For large enough n, Babe cannot use any jΨi 2 HB1 ⊗ HB2 other than that of
the form (2) without getting caught with probability arbitrarily close to one, so that the
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concealing condition is (8), and not (9). If Adam randomly picks one of the remainng n0 ,
modulate it by a single Ub for each b, and return it without the name to Babe, she would
not be able to use her entanglement (8) eectively on any qubit. This technique is similar to
the use of decoy states from Adam to Babe in [16, 17], and results in an eective concealing
condition (10) in place of (8), although (8) still applies. While the use of a single Ub does
not allow Adam to cheat successfully on a xed qubit, the freedom from the n0-ensemble
still allows him to entangle and launch an EPR attack. This attack is thwarted via the third
technique of Section 4, which demands that Adam return the remaining n0 − 1 qubits so
Babe can verify that they have not been disturbed. Example 1, our protocol QBCp2, can
be extended in this way to become an unconditionally secure protocol QBC2, which is a
modied version of a protocol with the same name in Ref. [15]. Alternatively, the same logic
applies to ghe following protocol, which is somewhat simpler.
PROTOCOL QBC4
(i) Babe sends Adam n qubits named by their temporal position, each
drawn independently with equal probability from S0, a fixed set of
four possible BB84 states.
(ii) Adam randomly picks n0 of these qubits and sets them aside, and asks
Babe to open the remaining n−n0 ones. He verifies them to be correct
in that they are distributed as prescribed in step (i). Otherwise the
protocol is aborted.
(iii) Adam randomly picks m out of the n0 remaining ones, modulates each
by the same U0 = I or U1 = R(pi), rotation by pi on the great circle
containing S0, and sends them back to Babe.
(iv) Adam opens by revealing b and returning the remaining n0−m qubits.
Babe verifies by measuring the corresponding projectors.
By proper choice of m, n0, and n, this protocol can be made both -concealing and -
binding for any  > 0, given that Adam opens perfectly on b = 0. The main steps of the
proof may be outlined as follows. Babe can cheat by entangling over each individual qubit
and also by using a distribution of qubits more biased than the one presented in step (i). To
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defeat her qubit entanglement cheating, let n0/n = 1. The probability that she would pair
HB11 with the correct HB21 , where HB = HB1⊗HB2 , HBm = HBm1⊗ . . .⊗HBmn , m 2 f1, 2g,
is thus 1. If the pairing is incorrect, the trace distance in (7) is not aected because, for
any three general states ρ, ρ0, σ,
k(ρ− ρ0)⊗ σk1 = kρ− ρ0k1. (11)
If the pairing is correct, we take the upper bound value of two for the trace distance. By
making both n0 and n large and testing on the arbitrary n− n0 qubits, one may guarantee,
to within any 2 > 0 for the resulting P
B
c = 1/2 + 2 with 2 ! 0 in the limit n0 ! 1 and
n!1, that the distribution of states in the two sets of qubits is indeed the one prescribed.
Accordingly, Babe can only get PBc = 1/2 + 3 for 3 ! 0 from the m committed qubits
for any xed m. This situation has been analyzed for QBC2 in Ref. [15]. From the union
bound on probability, one may take 1 + 2 + 3  , and the protocol becomes -concealing.
The asymptotic situation at m,n0, n ! 1 is quite apparent even in the absence of any
quantication with respect to the ’s. The protocol is binding on Adam, because m can be




7 Classical randomness and quantum purification: Type
3 protocols
A cornerstone of the general impossibility proof is the assertion that classical randomness can
be equivalently described as quantum determinacy via purication, say by (2), through the
doctrine of \Church of the Larger Hilbert Space," a technique also widely used in quantum
coin tossing. But equivalent for what? In what follows, we analyze the ways in which they
are not equivalent for use by Babe in a QBC protocol. The best argument I know for their
equivalence would be given alongside. This section demands a close reading and careful
deliberation, as several issues are tangled up in a confusing way.
First of all, it is clearly not true that all classical randomness can be reduced to that
arising from quantum description of a system. After all, there were many scenarios for the
occurrence of classical randomness before the rise of quantum physics, including especially
classical statistical mechanics. Even if one grants a determinate quantum description for the
underlying classical randomness involved, it is unreasonable to assume that any party would
possess the detailed knowledge to write down the complete quantum description. However, in
the context of QBC protocols, it is not only reasonable, but, in fact, mandatory to consider
such purication (2) for which a party can form and use such purication for cheating.
Thus it is a consideration of concealing, not the \Church of the Larger Hilbert Space," that
compels one to consider (2). The usual vague argument, which relies on the equivalence and
goes on to show that Babe’s subsequent measurement cannot aect the situation, is not valid
reasoning, because, while Babe cannot cheat better with her measurement, she may be able
to thwart Adam’s cheating as in QBC1. There is one sense in which a random k can be
equivalently described by its purication (2) | if a measurement on HB1 ⊗ HB2 is always
preceded by the measurement of fjfkig on HB1 rst. But then the concealing condition
should be (10) and not (8), and they are not equivalent, as seen in Example 1.
The following argument, in the spirit of the impossibility proof, appears to show that
the exact fjfkig or fjglig in (2) or (3) need not be known by Adam for nding his cheating
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transformation. Let the protocol be -concealing as a consequence of ρB0 (Ψ) being close
to ρB1 (Ψ) for one jΨi generated by Babe in the form (2). Assume Babe veries by rst
measuring fjfkig and then checking Adam’s opening. The commutativity of Adam’s and
Babe’s operations shows that the protocol performance is the same whether Babe measures
fjfkig during commitment or after Adam opens. The fact that Adam can cheat after Babe
measures fjfkig shows that the cheating must be independent of the specic fjfkig, even
though it is obtained for a known fjfkig. Note that this argument does not extend to the
knowledge of fλkg or to Type 1 protocols, for which the whole protocol would then be
altered.
Nevertheless, even just for fjfkig this argument contains a major gap, which is, in fact,
a general gap in the impossibility proof: it is not guaranteed that there is only one perfectly
veryng measurement for the protocol. In the particular case of randomness described above,
it means that the split measurement of fjfkig of HB1 , and then a measurement on HB2 , is not
the verifying measurement that has been proved susceptible to cheating, as described by the
impossibility proof. For an arbitrary protocol, the impossibility proof formulatoin does not,
and, in fact, cannot, specify what the possible verifying measurements could be. There is no
proof given that there cannot be more than one verifying measurement, for which dierent
cheating transformations are needed. However, it turns out that for protocols strictly of
Type 0, I can prove that this is indeed the case in the sense (IP) of (7) for all perfectly
verifying measurements, i.e., measurements that yield the \yes" result with probability one
corresponding to the opening bit value.
However, condition (8), which is taken to be the -concealing condition in the impossibil-
ity proof, is not a proper concealing condition due to the Libertarian Principle. Indeed, while
it implies that Adam can cheat according to the impossibility proof, the situation is misrep-
resented in that it may be Babe who can actually cheat. An example is given in Appendix
B of Ref. [17]. One cannot simply say that a protocol is now taken to be -concealing. One
has to describe quantitatively a necessary -concealing condition for the protocol before any
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meaningful performance analysis can be made, which is something the impossibility proof
fails to do in general.
Suppose that condition (9) is to be used, which is a sucient condition that has not been
shown to be necessary for concealing, as to be discussed later. For a Type 0 protocol that
is perfectly concealing, it may be shown [17, 20, 21] that the cheating UA is independent
of any fλkg and fjfkig in (2). The reason why secure protocols based on classical random
numbers alone are hard to construct is not because one forgets quantum purication. It
is because concealing under quantum purication is often more restrictive than concealing
under classical randomness, as demonstrated in protocol QBCp2 or Example 1. In any
event, under -concealing (9), it is not known whether PAc is close to one independently of
fλkg. Thus, there is no impossibility proof if (8) in a Type 0 protocol is replaced by (9) or
(10), which we call Type 3 protocols. An example is QBC3 of Refs. [16, 17]. For such Type 3
protocols, unconditional security may arise in the following way. Since Adam does not know
fλkg, one may consider rst a xed fλkg and then average over all possible cheating UA.
Such an average cannot produce PAc  1. However, this is actually a game-theoretic situation
involving freedom on both sides with opposing objectives with regard to the performance
criteria PAc and P
B
c . Perhaps it is most appropriate to regard fλkg and fpig as unknown
parameters with no meaningful distribution on them, which happens in many problems of
classical statistics. The performance analysis for the overall situation seems rather involved,
and new approaches may be needed to see whether security is actually provable. A direct
approach to the analysis of Type 3 protocols is given in Ref. [20].
It is argued in [22] that fλkg has to be taken openly known in a meaningful protocol,
because there is no guarantee that it can be kept secret. But surely a party can choose any
fλkg when forming (2) by his/her fancy of the moment, or by any beforehand chosen rule
unknown to Adam. In any cryptographic protocol, one has to assume that anything one
party does on her locality is not known to another party in a distant locality, relativity or
not, or else nothing can be a secret. The issue is not why Adam does not know fλkg. It is
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why he would know.
Generally, it is dicult to pin down a necessary condition for -concealing for an arbitrary
protocol without utilizing specic information about the protocol details. Thus, (9) may be
too strong because Babe in general does not know the distribution fpig on Adam’s secret
parameter i. It may not be necessary for -concealing that ρB0
 ρB1 holds for any fpig, similar
to the game situation involving fλkg just discussed. Thus, a general impossibility proof for
Type 3 protocols would face the immediate obstacle of not being able to specify quantitatively
either a necessary -concealing or -binding condition. One the other hand, security proof
for a particular protocol is much easier because sucient conditons and protocol mechanism
can be specically exploited.
We summarize the main points concerning random numbers.
1. Classical randomness is not generally reducible to quantum uncertainty.
2. The condition of -concealing with random numbers is not equivalent to its quantum
purication version, i.e., (8) is not equivalent to (10).
3. The coecients fλkg in the quantum purication (2) are generally not known to the
other party.
4. The concealing condition (8) used in the impossibility proof is, in general, neither
necessary nor sucient for concealing.
5. With random k and i, it is dicult to formulate a necessary -concealing or -binding
condition in order to start an impossibility proof.
6. The general situation of an unspecied protocol, even the simple case (1), is game-
theoretic.
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8 Summary and conclusion
If there is a general impossibility proof for secure QBC, one should be able to apply it
schematically to any proposed QBC protocol to show that it is insecure. This often cannot
be done. The reason is that the impossibility proof formulation is quite restrictive, and many
nontrivial details in a systematic proof have not been spelled out. Some such criticisms have
already been discussed in Ref. [15], but they are analyzed quantitatively in this paper.
We introduced several new techniques for protocol design, not covered by the impossibility
proof formulation which only applies to what we call Type 0 protocols. We presented three
new types of protocols:
 Type 1 | partial checking of evidence,
 Type 2 | shifting of evidence state spaces,
 Type 3 | utilization of anonymous states.
A specic Type 1 protocol, QBC1, is proved unconditionally secure in the Appendix.
We indicateed how a Type 2 protocol, QBC4, may be proved unconditionally secure. The
situation is yet undecided for Type 3 protocols. There is no impossibility proof, but there is
no protocol which is clearly secure even just intuitively.
Nevertheless, the content of this paper hopefully makes clear the vast richness of this
subject yet to be uncovered, especially for protocols that can be practically implemented in
a realistic environment.
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Appendix: security proof for QBC1
The procotol QBC1 of Section 4 functions in the simple way described by (1) with one
additional stage at the end of commitment | Babe asks Adam to reveal part of the evidence
to force him to make a measurement that destroys his entanglement. We now sketch the
complete security proof.
The protocol can be made unconditionaly secure by proper choice of jhφjφ0ij and n0, with
n being the security parameter, as follows. Adam can guarantee concealing by using uniform
probability 1/2n−1 for each sequence of either parity. In that case, ρB0 − ρB1 factorizes into
products of individual qubit parts. Let j = fj1, . . . , jng 2 f0, 1gn, Pl0 = jφihφj, Pl1 = jφ0ihφ0j,
l 2 f1, . . . , ng. Let 0 = fjj
Ln
l=1 jl = 0g, 1 = fjj
Ln









Pljl, b 2 f0, 1g , (A.1)
and so





(Pl0 − Pl1) . (A.2)
Thus, Babe’s optimum quantum decision reduces to optimally discriminating between jφi
and jφ0i for each qubit individually, and then seeing whether there is an even or odd number







1− jhφjφ0ij2 . (A.3)
The optimum error probability PBc of correct bit decision on the sequence is, from the even







(1− 2pe)n . (A.4)
Thus PBc is close to 1/2 exponentially in n independently of 1/2  pe > 0.
After committing j0i, Adam can still try to cheat with the fjeiig measurement by
declaring one qubit to be in a state dierent from the actual one. the probability of success
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is PAc = jhφjφ0ij2  1, a design parameter of the protocol. He can also launch the usual EPR
attack, with the result given by (IP) of (7) from the impossibility proof if Babe does not ask
him to reveal the evidence partially. If Babe does as called for by the protocol, Adam has
to make a measurement on HA, otherwise he cannot open b = 0 perfectly. Also there is no
way he can put structures into the fjeiig so that he can re-entangle the qubits after Babe’s
request for partial disclosure, as a consequence of local state invariance [15]:
Theorem (local state invariance). Let ρAB be a state on HA⊗HB with ρB  trAρAB. The
state ρB remains invariant under any quantum operation on HA alone.
This protocol can be made -concealing by choosing
jhφjφ0ij2  1   (A.5)
and, from (A.4), choosing n0 to satisfy
(1− 1)n0  42 . (A.6)
To open b = 0 perfectly, Adam has to entangle only among subsets of the n qubits so that
the overall parity is even. To improve his cheating probability beyond 1, Adam has to
entangle at least two qubits together. Since he has to measure on the space entangled to a
set of qubits in order to reveal just one qubit in the set, his optimal action, as shown in the
following, for getting at least one of his entangled set to survive the test is to entangle pairs
of qubits among the n ones with the overall parity chosen to yield b = 0 or 1. Let n be even.
The probability P (n0, n) that the n0 remaining ones contain no pair is










For large n, (A.7) can be made arbitrarily close to one, i.e., limn!1 P (n0, n) = 1. Indeed,
(A.7) is the best Adam can do for the following reason. Let nj  2,
PJ
j=1 nj  n, be the
number of elements in J distinct subsets of the n qubits that he entangles. The number
of ways N for the remaining n0 qubits not to contain even one such subset is clearly an
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increasing function of nj for xed J and a decreasing function of J for xed n. Thus N is
minimized by having nj as small as possible and J as big as possible, which results in the
numerator of (7) for J = n/2 and nj = 2. Thus P
A
c   for large enough n, and the protocol
is unconditionally secure.
Note that there is no need to compute ρBb for the above pair entanglement and check
concealing for them. There is also no need to assume that Babe would have to take Adam’s
a priori probabilities to be uniform. There is no game situation here, no probability that
Adam may be able to cheat if he gives Babe a chance to cheat. This is because, from the
Intent Principle of Section 3, Adam, not being able to cheat in any case, may as well use
uniform prior probabilities to make the protocol -concealing.
For this protocol, QBC1, it is not hard to see that, if the probability P0 = 1 − 0 of
imperfect opening for b = 0 is allowed, the best state j0i needs to be 0-close in norm to
a perfectly pair-entangled one described above. Thus 0 can be added to 1 and  when the
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